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A LITTLE LIGHT ON THE MAYO: JUSTIFYING REVERSAL OF 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR 
PATHOLOGY DECISION 
Kevin J. Georgek* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patents grant their owners the right to exclude others from 
practicing a claimed invention for a limited time.1  Whether patents 
actually protect the economic interests of their owners, provide 
incentive for innovation, and foster economic growth has been 
extensively debated.2  There are undisputedly, however, times when 
the same patents that may protect an entity’s exclusive interest in a 
claimed invention—to an important, lifesaving therapy for instance—
simultaneously deprive others of access to that very invention, 
resulting in significant harm to those excluded.3  Precedent indicates, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; 2010 B.S., Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute. 
 1  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Boomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) 
(defining a patent as a franchise granting “the right to exclude everyone from 
making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the 
patentee”).  
 2  See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An 
Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 116–17 (2010) (asserting 
that patents afford inventors—particularly small firms and individuals—a degree of 
insulation from competitors who seek to sell the same invention at a lower price in 
the marketplace and that this protection from competition spurs innovation by 
enabling inventors to recover development costs without fearing that competitors 
will unduly benefit from their innovative ideas); see also Andrew W. Torrance & Bill 
Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 
131 (2009) (offering empirical data to debunk the “orthodox assumption that 
technological innovation can be encouraged through the prospect of patent 
protection”). 
 3  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. 
App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (listing parties who face prohibitive costs of obtaining 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic testing as a result of their insurance companies’ failure 
to cover the cost of testing and by their inability to pursue alternative testing or 
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and policy dictates, that when a patent has the potential to inhibit 
subsequent advances in a given field to the detriment of researchers 
and patients, a modification to the traditional calculus for 
determining whether subject matter is patent eligible is warranted.4  
This modification involves broadening the scope of appropriate 
considerations to encompass extra-statutory concerns. 
The merits of gene patenting, and the broader issue of subject-
matter eligibility generally, have been at the center of many recent 
debates.5  This Comment seeks to provide an overview of subject-
matter-eligibility jurisprudence leading up to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit’s (Federal Circuit) decision in Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology).6  It also suggests that the Supreme Court—by 
granting certiorari in this case on the question of whether human 
genes are patentable—had an opportunity to clarify the appropriate 
analysis for determining whether the subject matter at issue in Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology is patent eligible.  Part II of this Comment 
provides a historical perspective into the development of modern 
subject-matter-eligibility jurisprudence and details the approach the 
Supreme Court adopted in Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus 
Laboratories., Inc. (“Mayo”),7 a recent case concerning patent 
eligibility.  Part III discusses Ass’n for Molecular Pathology and details 
the method for determining patent eligibility that the Federal Circuit 
advanced in that case.  Part IV argues that the Federal Circuit erred 
in its dismissive treatment of the effect of Mayo on Ass’n for Molecular 
 
obtain second opinions on test results since the patent holder is the only provider of 
testing services in the United States). 
 4  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012). 
 5  See generally Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Derail the Next Generation 
of Genetic Technologies?: A Reassessment of the Evidence Suggests Not, 80 UMKC L. REV. 563 
(2012); Abigail Lauer, Comment, The Disparate Effects of Gene Patents on Different 
Categories of Scientific Research, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179 (2011); W. Nicholson Price II, 
Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and 
Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601 (2012). 
 6  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013).  Given the extensive procedural history of this case, a point of clarification at 
this juncture is warranted.  Whenever this Comment refers to “Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology,” it is discussing the Federal Circuit’s second opinion in the case following 
remand by the Supreme Court.  
 7  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012). 
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Pathology because neither Supreme Court nor Federal Circuit 
precedent supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different claim 
types in isolation.  Accordingly, this section describes three opinions 
from Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent which explicitly 
recognize that concerns raised in the context of one type of patent 
claim are applicable in the context of different claim types.8  Part IV 
also discusses the Supreme Court’s repeated disinclination to adhere 
to rigid tests promulgated by the Federal Circuit in favor of more 
nuanced and holistic analyses—particularly in the areas of subject-
matter eligibility and obviousness.  Part V discusses the Supreme 
Court’s grant of certiorari in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology on the 
question of whether human genes are patentable and argues that 
although the Court ultimately reached the correct result, it failed to 
address the appropriate role of policy considerations in the patent 
eligibility analysis. 
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the Federal Circuit’s 
dismissive treatment of Mayo contravenes Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit precedent, which dictates that the reservations the Court 
expressed in refusing to uphold Mayo’s method claims are applicable 
to the composition claims in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology.  
Additionally, important policy considerations, including the harmful 
effects of gene patents on genetic research, test quality, and patient 
access to testing, compel the conclusion that the claims at issue in this 
case should be rendered ineligible for patent protection.  Finally, the 
Supreme Court’s consistent skepticism of strict tests promulgated by 
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court’s decision to address on 
certiorari the broad question of whether human genes are 
patentable,9 signal that the Court should not have limited its analysis 
of patent eligibility to the text of the statute, but rather weighed 
important extra-statutory concerns into the subject-matter-eligibility 
analysis. 
 
 8  See F. SCOTT KIEFF, PAULINE NEWMAN, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & HENRY E. SMITH, 
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 92–95 (Robert C. Clark et. al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) (noting 
that patent claims are primarily characterized as one of five types including: 
composition, process (or method), apparatus, product-by-process, or means-plus-
function). 
 9  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part. 
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II. PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Early Cases 
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the power “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective . . . Discoveries.”10  Congress, in turn, codified laws 
governing the award of these exclusive rights in Title 35 of the 
United States Code.11  The types of discoveries that are entitled to 
receive this protection are described in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (section 101), 
which provides: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”12  While this 
language has often been interpreted broadly,13 courts have 
nonetheless consistently recognized implicit limitations to the scope 
of patentable subject matter, often stating that laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.14 
Nature’s handiwork is not patent eligible.15  Manifestations of the 
laws of nature such as “the heat of the sun, electricity, [and] the 
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all 
men . . . and [are] reserved exclusively to none.”16  Material derived 
from natural sources which is then transformed or reduced into a 
form that possesses characteristics markedly different17 from those of 
 
 10  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 11  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 12  Id. 
 13  See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 14  Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (awarding a patent for a 
process of curing synthetic rubber,  which, despite employing a well-known 
mathematical formula, applied it in a process that when considered as a whole is 
patent eligible), and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (upholding 
the award of a patent directed to a live, human-made microorganism capable of 
breaking down crude oil—a property that no naturally occurring bacteria possess), 
with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978) (holding that a formula for computing 
alarm limits—absent  any disclosure relating to the chemical processes employed, the 
method for monitoring variables, or the means of setting off the alarm—was not 
patent eligible), and Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle . . . is a 
fundamental truth . . . [which] cannot be patented, as no one can claim in . . . them 
an exclusive right.”). 
 15  See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 16  Id. at 130. 
 17  Although the precise threshold beyond which a composition becomes 
“markedly different” than any naturally existing composition remains elusive, the 
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the material as it exists in nature, however, has long been recognized 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as 
patent eligible.18  While the precise boundaries of what constitutes 
“markedly different” subject matter remain unclear, the Federal 
Circuit defined a “markedly different” molecule as one that has “a 
distinct[] chemical structure and identity” from naturally occurring 
molecules.19 
While section 101 does not, on its face, declare living matter 
patent eligible, the Plant Patents Act of 1930—which declared that 
plants were eligible for patenting if they could be reproduced 
asexually—broadened the scope of patentable subject matter to 
include a form of living matter that had not undergone an extraction 
or a purification step, but that existed purely in its natural form.20  
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 also recognized that certain 
forms of live plants were eligible for protection, but explicitly 
declared that bacteria were outside the scope of the Act.21  Bacteria 
were shortly thereafter determined to be within the scope of patent-
eligible subject matter, provided that they displayed “markedly 
different characteristics from any [bacteria] found in nature.”22  The 
prohibition on patenting laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and 
abstract ideas standing alone also encompasses methods and 
 
Federal Circuit illustrated by way of analogy to case law that it lies somewhere 
between non-markedly different combinations of existing molecules and markedly 
different genetically engineered molecules.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in 
part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  
 18  See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 
(1908) (stating that in order to overcome the bar on patenting products of nature, 
an inventor must prove that the product for which he seeks a patent has become a 
new and distinct article with new characteristics or uses); Park-Davis & Co. v. Mulford 
& Co., 196 F. 496, 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding that patents claiming a derivative of 
crystalline adrenaline, extracted from suprarenal tissue in animals for use as an agent 
to increase blood pressure, were valid); U.S. Patent #135,245 (claiming a form of 
brewer’s yeast “free from organic germs of disease”—despite the fact that brewer’s 
yeast existed in nature—which could be used to brew beer that was easier to 
preserve).  
 19  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 689 F.3d at 1328. 
 20  Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (2006)).  
 21  Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1930) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2006)) (“The breeder of any 
sexually or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has so 
reproduced the variety . . . shall be entitled to plant variety protection for the 
variety . . . .”). 
 22  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).  
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processes that include this subject matter within their scope.23  Such 
subject matter is only eligible for patenting if, when considered as a 
whole, the patent describes an application of the law of nature, natural 
phenomenon, or abstract idea, and does not simply attempt to claim 
the naturally existing subject matter itself.24 
Currently, the USPTO characterizes isolated DNA that encodes 
specific genes as patent-eligible subject matter.25  The USPTO’s Utility 
Examination Guidelines instruct that “an inventor’s discovery of a 
gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition 
isolated from its natural state and processed through purifying steps 
that separate the gene from other molecules naturally associated with 
it.”26  While these Guidelines do not have the binding effect of law, 
they nevertheless remain influential in that a reviewing court may 
defer to the agency’s interpretation of a statute it oversees.27  Despite 
their influence, however, the scope of the rights the Guidelines 
confer to a patent holder remains unclear.28 
In addition to its reliance on the USPTO’s Utility Examination 
Guidelines, the Federal Circuit—in determining that the isolated 
DNA at issue in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology was patent eligible—
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Funk Brothers. 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (Funk Bros.) and Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
“set out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of 
compositions of matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”29  As 
 
 23  See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
 24  Id. (emphasis added). 
 25  See Eric J. Rogers, Comment, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 28 (2010). 
 26  U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Dep’t of Commerce, RIN 0651-AB09, UTILITY 
EXAMINATION GUIDELINES (2001). 
 27  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referring to 
the Utility Examination Guidelines). 
 28  See Peter Edwards, Comment, AMP v. Myriad: The Future of Medicine and Patent 
Law, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 811, 818 (2011) (noting the lack of clarity in the 
language of the Guidelines which provides that while the holder of a gene patent has 
the right to exclude others from using that gene, the patent holder must also 
promote discovery of other uses of the gene by other researchers.  The Guidelines’ 
lack of clarity is also evident in the language which instructs that while genes are 
patentable, neither the DNA sequences nor the underlying genetic information are 
patentable.  Edwards notes that “it is not clear what the researcher is patenting in a 
gene, however, if not genetic information”). 
 29  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326..  
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such, a detailed discussion of these cases is warranted. 
In 1948, the Supreme Court weighed in on the distinction 
between patent-eligible subject matter and unpatentable products of 
nature in Funk Bros.30  Kalo initiated a lawsuit against Funk Bros., 
alleging that it infringed Kalo’s patent for a bacterial inoculant31 for 
use with leguminous plants.32  Prior to the invention, in order to 
optimize legume growth, farmers were required to select the optimal 
strain of bacteria from a group of at least six species which 
corresponded with their desired legume.33  Mixed bacterial cultures 
largely proved ineffective because the bacteria, when mixed, 
produced inhibitory effects on each other, resulting in reduced levels 
of plant growth.34  The invention in this case was a mixture of 
Rhizobium bacteria that did not display the commonly observed 
inhibitory effects of each other on legumes.35  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the inventor “[did] not create [the] state of 
inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria.”36  As justification for 
the Court’s conclusion that “[the bacteria’s] qualities are the work of 
nature . . . . [and] [t]hose qualities are of course not patentable,” the 
Court reasoned that “the combination of species produces no new 
bacteria, no change in the species of bacteria, and no enlargement of 
the range of their utility.”37 The Court further characterized the 
bacteria as “manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”38 
 
 30  333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 31  The Court offered the following description of the challenged invention: “An 
inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-
inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains 
being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the 
leguminous plant for which they are specific.”  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 127 n.1.  An 
alternative explanation of the process of bacterial inoculation can be found at: 
http://www.ctahr.hawaii.edu/bnf/Downloads/Training/Legume%20use/Title.Pdf 
(explaining that increasing the concentration of Rhizobia, unique bacteria that 
naturally exists in the soil, can result in the infection of the root hairs of legumes.  
This infection results in the formation of nitrogen-fixing nodules which act as “small 
nitrogen factories” that produce proteins essential for plant growth). 
 32  See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128. 
 33  Id. at 129 (explaining that “[n]o one species [of bacteria] will infect the roots 
of all species of leguminous plants. But each [species of bacteria] will infect well-
defined groups of those plants . . . . Thus if a farmer had crops of clover, alfalfa, and 
soy beans he would have to use three separate inoculants.”). 
 34  Id. at 129–30.   
 35  Id. at 130. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
 38  Id. at 130. 
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The difficult task of discerning an unpatentable product of 
nature from a patentable product of human ingenuity was again 
before the Court in Chakrabarty.39  Ananda Chakrabarty, a 
microbiologist at General Electric, sought to patent a genetically 
engineered bacterium that was capable of breaking down crude oil.40  
The Court again recognized the limits to patentability, stating: 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas 
have been held not patentable. . . .  Thus, a new mineral 
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is 
not patentable subject matter.  Likewise, Einstein could not 
patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton 
have patented the law of gravity.41  Such discoveries are 
“manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”42 
In this case, however, the Court ultimately upheld the patent, 
finding that “the patentee has produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one 
having the potential for significant utility.  His discovery is not 
nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject 
matter under section 101.”43  In formulating its conclusion, the Court 
looked in part to the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 
Patent Act, which indicated that Congress intended patentable 
subject matter to broadly “include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”44 
In sum, while the patent in Funk Bros. attempted to claim a mere 
mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, the patent in Chakrabarty was 
directed to a new bacterium which exhibited characteristics not 
found in nature.  Notably, the Court approached Funk Bros. and 
 
 39  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
 40  The Court offered the following explanation of the claimed invention: 
“Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate from the chromosomes of the cell.  
In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids control the 
oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria.  In particular, the two researchers 
discovered plasmids capable of degrading camphor and octane, two components of 
crude oil.  In the work represented by the patent application at issue here, 
Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of 
degrading four different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained 
stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterium, which itself has no capacity for degrading 
oil.”  Id. at 305 n.1. 
 41  Id. at 309. 
 42  Id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130). 
 43  Id. at 310 (emphasis added).  
 44  Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952)); see infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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Chakrabarty in a similar fashion; primarily relying on a comparison 
between the function of the claimed invention with the function of a 
naturally occurring analogue. 
It is not immediately apparent where Myriad’s isolated DNA fits 
along the spectrum delineated by Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty.  
Whether the isolated DNA at issue has a “distinct chemical structure 
and identity” and meets the Federal Circuit’s definition of “markedly 
different” is open to debate.  However, determining whether isolated 
BRCA1/2 DNA surpasses the elusive “markedly different” threshold is 
not determinative of patent eligibility.  The Supreme Court—in 
reviewing the issues presented in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology on 
certiorari and ultimately vacating the Federal Circuit’s ruling—
declined to confine its analysis to the cases offered by the Federal 
Circuit.45  Instead, on remand, the Court advised that the Federal 
Circuit consider the issues in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology in light of its 
recent decision in Mayo46—a case that recognized a more nuanced set 
of criteria for determining patent eligibility than the test advanced in 
Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty.47 
B.  Subject-Matter Eligibility in Mayo 
Prometheus Laboratories develops products that enable 
physicians to detect, diagnose, and treat disorders in the fields of 
gastroenterology and oncology.48  It also specializes in personalized 
medicine—a method of using an individual’s unique serologic, 
genetic, and inflammation markers to diagnose certain disorders and 
predict treatment outcomes.49  The Prometheus patents at issue in 
this case were directed to a method for administering thiopurine 
drugs,50 one that sought to maximize the efficacy of the drugs for 
each individual patient by accounting for individuals’ different rates 
of metabolizing thiopurines.51  The following claim in the 
 
 45  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(2012). 
 46  See id. 
 47  See infra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
 48  See About Prometheus, PROMETHEUSLABS.COM, http://www.prometheuslabs.com
/About.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
 49  See Diagnostics, PROMETHEUSPATIENTS.COM, http://www.prometheuspatients
.com/Products_Diagnostics.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
 50  Thiopurines are a class of synthetic drugs used to treat immune mediated 
gastro-intestinal disorders including Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis.  See 
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”). 
 51  See id.  
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Prometheus patent describes the invention and is one of the claims at 
issue: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment 
of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-
thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level of 
6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine 
less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates 
a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject and wherein the level of 6-
thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said 
drug subsequently administered to said subject.52 
Prometheus initiated an infringement lawsuit when Mayo 
Medical Laboratories announced that it planned to introduce its own 
test to the marketplace—one which used slightly higher thiopurine 
metabolite levels to measure toxicity.53  Mayo moved for summary 
judgment, alleging that the Prometheus patents were invalid because 
they impermissibly claimed the “correlation between the recited 
metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy and/or toxicity,” which it 
alleged was an unpatentable “natural, observable phenomenon” and 
that “the patents impermissibly preempt use of the correlation.”54  
Thus, Mayo argued that the Prometheus patents did not preclude 
them from marketing their test.55 
The district court granted Mayo’s motion, finding that 
Prometheus’s claims reciting correlations between thiopurine drug 
metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity were directed to 
natural phenomena.56  On appeal, the Federal Circuit—relying on 
the machine-or-transformation (M or T) test57—reversed the district 
court’s decision.58  As understood by the Federal Circuit, the M or T 
 
 52  U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); see infra notes 80–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 53  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04CV1200, 2008 WL 
878910, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“Prometheus II”). 
 54  Id. at *5 (quoting Doc. No. 502 at 11, 13). 
 55  See id. 
 56  See id. at *6, *14. 
 57  See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 58  See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”).  
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test provided that, “a claimed process is surely patent-eligible under 
section 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”59  
The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that Prometheus’s method 
claims satisfied the M or T test and were therefore patent eligible.60 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Federal Circuit determined 
that the Prometheus patents fell within the scope of section 101 
because both the “administering” and “determining” steps 
“‘transform an article into a different state or thing’ and this 
transformation ‘is central to the purpose of the claimed process.’”61  
Regarding the “administering” step, the Federal Circuit recognized 
that “the human body necessarily undergoes a transformation [when 
drugs are administered]” and dismissed “the fact that the change of 
the administered drug to its metabolite relies on natural process” as 
dispositive of patent ineligibility.62  The court characterized the 
transformation in this case as “the result of the physical 
administration of a drug to a subject to transform—i.e., treat—the 
subject, which is itself not a natural process.”63  The Federal Circuit 
also found the “determining” step of Prometheus’s claimed method 
to be “transformative and central.”64  The court stated that 
“[d]etermining the levels of [a drug] in a subject necessarily involves 
a transformation, for those levels cannot be determined by mere 
inspection.”65  Rather, this determination requires a certain amount 
of manipulation in the form of extracting the metabolites from the 
human body and determining their concentration.66  The Federal 
Circuit dismissed Mayo’s additional argument that the Prometheus 
patents preempted a natural phenomenon by stating that “because 
the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test, they do not 
preempt a fundamental principle.”67  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
held that Prometheus’s claims were properly directed to patent-
 
 59  Id. at 1342 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 
S. Ct. 3218 (2010)). 
 60  See id. at 1350. 
 61  Id. at 1345 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 
S. Ct. 3218 (2010)). 
 62  Id. at 1346.  
 63  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (“Prometheus III”).  
 64  Id. at 1347. 
 65  Id. 
 66  See id.  
 67  Id. at 1349. 
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eligible subject matter. 
The Supreme Court, having re-visited the question of subject-
matter eligibility in its Bilski v. Kappos decision, which it handed down 
the day before, granted certiorari in the Mayo case, vacated the 
Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case to the Federal 
Circuit for further consideration in light of Bilski.68  In its Bilski 
decision, the Supreme Court addressed the patent eligibility of 
business methods.69  The claims at issue were directed to a method of 
risk hedging in commodities markets, which initiate a series of 
transactions between commodity providers and consumers who had a 
certain risk position, identify market participants for the commodity 
who had a corresponding counter-risk position, and initiate a series 
of transactions between the commodity providers and market 
participants.70  The Court ultimately determined that the claims were 
drawn towards the concept of hedging risk—an unpatentable, 
abstract idea.71  Notably, the Court also held that the M or T test is 
not the sole test for patent eligibility under section 101, but rather is 
a “useful and important clue, an investigative tool” for determining 
patent eligibility.72  On remand, the Federal Circuit applied largely 
the same analysis that it did in its first Mayo decision, again holding 
that the claims recited patent-eligible subject matter under section 
10173 and again relying on the M or T test to reach that conclusion.74 
On March 20, 2012, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the 
Federal Circuit’s decision and held that Prometheus’s claims were 
not properly drawn to patent-eligible subject matter under section 
101.75  Rather, the Court determined the patents effectively claimed 
ineligible laws of nature that described the relationships between 
levels of thiopurine metabolites and therapeutic efficacy or toxicity.76  
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court questioned whether “the 
patent claims add enough to their statement of the correlations to 
 
 68  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 
(2010).  
 69  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 70  See id. at 3223–24. 
 71  See id. at 3231. 
 72  Id. at 3227. 
 73  See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (“Prometheus IV”). 
 74  See id. at 1355 (stating that Prometheus’s claimed methods “satisfy the 
transformation prong” of the M or T test).  
 75  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012).  
 76  See id. at 1305.  
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allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible 
processes that apply natural laws.”77  The Court, turning first to the 
“administering” step, stated that it “simply refer[red] to the relevant 
audience”—namely, doctors who are familiar with using thiopurines 
to treat patients.78  The Court noted that merely limiting the use of an 
abstract idea to a predefined technological environment is not 
enough to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract 
ideas.79  Turning to the wherein clauses in the Prometheus patent on 
page ten supra, the Court dismissed the possibility that they could 
change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application by 
summarily stating that they “simply tell a doctor about the relevant 
natural laws . . . .”80  Finally, the Court understood the determining 
step to instruct the doctor to “engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity.”81  The Court ultimately determined that none 
of the administering, determining, or wherein limitations standing 
alone or in combination “[were] sufficient to transform unpatentable 
natural correlations into patentable applications of those 
regularities.”82 
The Court suggested additional justifications for its conclusion 
that Prometheus’s patents concerned ineligible subject matter from 
two cases dealing with the patent eligibility of processes using 
mathematical formulas which, like laws of nature, are not patentable 
standing alone.83  First, the Court stated that Prometheus’s claims 
“present[] a case for patentability that is weaker than Diehr’s patent-
eligible claim and no stronger than Flook’s unpatentable one.”84  
While Diehr and Flook have proven difficult to reconcile,85 developing 
 
 77  Id. at 1297.  
 78  Id. 
 79  See id. at 1291 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)). 
 80  Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1291. 
 81  Id. at 1298 (stating that this “activity” involves determining levels of thiopurine 
metabolites in the blood—a routine and well-known step in the process for 
measuring toxicity). 
 82  See id. 
 83  See id. at 1292. 
 84  Id. 
 85  See Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud: The Future of 
Intellectual Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 589 (2011) (noting 
that Diehr and Flook had “very similar facts” with opposite results); Mark A. Lemley, 
Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011) (noting that the claims in Diehr and 
Flook are “exactly parallel”); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against 
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program Related Inventions, 39 EMORY 
L.J. 1025, 1104 (“[P]ost-Benson case law is replete with awkward distinctions and 
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a complete understanding of the Court’s rationale for its holding in 
Mayo requires a closer examination of these cases. 
In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered the patentability of a 
method for updating alarm limits for a catalytic chemical conversion 
of hydrocarbons, in which the only point of novelty over prior, well-
known methods for changing alarm limits86 was the inventor’s 
employment of a mathematical formula.87  The entire process 
consisted of essentially three steps, including “an initial step which 
merely measures the present value of the process variable (e.g., the 
temperature); an intermediate step which uses an algorithm to 
calculate an updated alarm-limit value; and a final step in which the 
actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value.”88  The Court 
noted that the plain language of section 101 does not indicate 
whether the claimed method—characterized only by the novel use of 
a mathematical formula—was patent-eligible subject matter.89  It also 
acknowledged that “[t]he line between a patentable process and an 
unpatentable principle is not always clear.”90  The Court stated that 
because mathematical formulas are not eligible for patenting by 
themselves,91 the question in this case was whether “post–solution 
applications of . . . a formula makes [a] method eligible for patent 
protection.”92  Ultimately, the Court answered its own question in the 
negative, characterizing the claimed process as accomplishing 
nothing more than “provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula for 
computing an updated alarm limit.”93 
Three years after the Court decided Flook, it was again tasked 
with determining the patent eligibility of a process which employed a 
mathematical equation.94  The claimed process was a method for 
 
results that are often difficult to reconcile.”). 
 86  See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (offering an explanation of an 
alarm limit as a predetermined number  that, when exceeded by certain process 
variables such as pressure and temperature during the process of catalytic 
conversion, signals either irregularities in the process or the presence of potential 
dangers). 
 87  See id. at 586–87.  
 88  Id. at 585. 
 89  Id. at 588. 
 90  Id. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91  Id. at 585 (“In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 
273, we held that the discovery of a novel and useful mathematical formula may not 
be patented.”). 
 92  Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added). 
 93  Id. at 586.  
 94  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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curing rubber which used certain instruments to continuously 
monitor the temperature inside a mold cavity, transmit the 
information to a digital computer,95 and send signals to open the 
mold at the appropriate time.96  Unlike in Flook, the Diehr patent did 
not attempt to claim a well-known equation itself, nor did it seek to 
preempt further use of that equation.  Rather, the applicants sought 
only “to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction 
with all of the other steps in their claimed process.”97  The Court held 
that the claimed process was patent eligible, stating that it did “not 
view [the] claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but 
rather to [claim] an industrial process for the molding of rubber 
products . . . .”98  In sum, the Court stated that its opinions in Flook 
and Diehr were consistent with the Court’s general position that 
“simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of 
generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas 
cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”99 
As a final justification for its holding in Mayo, the Court 
recognized that its subject-matter-eligibility jurisprudence has 
“repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of 
nature.”100  The Court was concerned that “because [natural] laws and 
principles are ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work,’ 
there is a danger that granting patents that tie up their use will 
inhibit future innovation . . . .”101  Prometheus’s claims implicated this 
concern because “telling a doctor to measure metabolite levels and to 
consider the resulting measurements in light of the correlations they 
describe . . . tie[s] up his subsequent treatment decision regardless of 
whether he changes his dosage in the light of the inference he draws 
 
 95  Id. at 177 n.2 (indicating that the computer made continuous adjustments to 
the cure time by employing the Arrhenius equation, which can be expressed as ln v = 
CZ + x where ln v is the natural log of the total required cure time, v; C is the 
activation constant; Z is the temperature in the mold; and x is a constant dependent 
on the geometry of the mold in the press).  
 96  Id. at 177–79. 
 97  Id. at 187. 
 98  Id. at 192–93. 
 99  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300  
(2012) (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 64, 65, 67, 93 (1972); and Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010), 
supporting the Court’s general view that appending conventional steps to laws of 
nature does not make those ideas patent eligible). 
 100  Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1301.  
 101  Id. at 1292 (quoting Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
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using the correlations.”102  The Court clearly expressed a concern that 
declaring Prometheus’s claims eligible for patenting would impede 
the development of subsequent treatment methods that combine 
Prometheus’s claimed correlations with other discoveries.103  This 
concern over the inhibitory effect on subsequent research and 
development that would result from awarding patent protection to 
the technology in Mayo seems to conflict with the Court’s assertion in 
the final sentence of the Mayo opinion that “[w]e need not determine 
here whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection for 
discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.”104  The Court 
made clear earlier in the opinion that tying up the use of natural laws 
“threaten[s] to inhibit the development of more refined treatment 
recommendations”105 and “impedes progress more than it . . . 
promote[s] it.”106 Regardless of whether the Court characterizes its 
concern as one rooted in policy or a desire to avoid frustrating 
scientific progress, the Court’s holding in Mayo is undeniably 
founded on considerations external to the minimal requirements 
enumerated in section 101.  Mayo provides that courts determining 
patent eligibility should consider the invention not only in light of 
section 101 and cases that have interpreted the statute, but also 
separately with an awareness of the harm that could stem from tying 
up the use of natural laws and inhibiting discovery in a field. 
 III. ASS’N FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF MAYO 
Mayo has already proven impactful—and likely stands to play an 
even greater role in the near future—as courts struggle to develop 
consistent standards in the subject-matter eligibility arena.  Its 
influence was felt, although minimally, in Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology—a highly publicized107 case and the latest chapter in the 
 
 102  Id.  
 103  See id. 
 104  Id. at 1305. 
 105  Id. at 1302. 
 106  Id. at 1293.  These concerns indicate that increased protection for discoveries 
that make use of laws of nature is undesirable.  
 107  See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Court Rules Biotech Firm Can Patent Human Genes, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390443324404577593251249665074.html; Jonathan Stempel, Myriad 
Wins Gene Patent Ruling from US Appeals Court, REUTERS  (Aug. 16, 2012, 4:23 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/16/us-myriad 
-patent-idUSBRE87F12K20120816 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).  
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gene-patent debate. 
In the mid-1990s, researchers confirmed that mutations in the 
BRCA1/2 genes108 correlated with an increased risk of developing 
breast and ovarian cancer.109  Women who inherit these genetic 
mutations face up to an 85% risk of breast cancer—the second 
leading cause of cancer related death among women in the United 
States—and up to a 50% risk of ovarian cancer.110  BRCA1 mutations 
have also been linked with cancers of the cervix, uterus, pancreas, 
and colon while BRCA2 mutations have been observed to increase 
the risk of developing pancreatic and stomach cancer as well as 
melanoma.111  Male carriers of the BRCA1/2 mutation face an 
increased risk of breast and prostate cancer.112  Determining the 
existence of BRCA1/2 mutations is a critically important diagnostic 
and preventative tool.113  Aside from the benefits that stem from an 
individual’s ability to make informed decisions relating to aspects of 
their life ranging from daily activities to family planning, knowledge 
of BRCA1/2 mutations enables doctors to tailor the most effective 
treatment regimens for each individual patient—selecting from 
minimally intrusive options such as increased surveillance, to more 
aggressive forms of treatment like chemotherapy.114 
In September 1994, Myriad Genetics, Inc. (“Myriad”)—based on 
its work in conjunction with researchers at the National Institute for 
Environmental Health Sciences, the University of Utah, McGill 
 
 108  See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER 
INST., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA#r5 (last updated 
May 29, 2009) (stating that the names BRCA1 and BRCA2 stand for breast cancer 
susceptibility gene 1 and 2, respectively, and explaining that tumor suppressor genes 
normally function to maintain the stability of a cell’s genetic material (DNA) and 
help to prevent uncontrolled cell growth). 
 109  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  
 110  Id.  
 111  BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, supra note 108.  
 112  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
 113  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), 
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 114  Id.  
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University, and Eli Lilly Co.—sequenced the BRCA1 gene and sought 
to patent it.115  By the end of 1995, Myriad filed for patents on the 
BRCA2 gene following its work with scientists in Canada and at the 
University of Pennsylvania.116  As the sole licensee117 of the patents 
related to the BRCA1/2 genes, Myriad controls all research and 
testing on or associated with the genes118 and, as the benefactor of a 
limited monopoly, charges inflated prices for the test.119  In addition, 
Myriad has aggressively prohibited other labs from performing its 
patented test120 and generally refuses to grant licenses for second 
opinion diagnostic testing.121  Studies indicate that this exclusivity 
impedes research and hinders the development of improvements to 
testing.122 
Myriad’s seven patents contain a total of fifteen composition and 
method claims.123  The composition claims are directed to three 
different types of isolated DNA molecules including: (1) isolated 
DNA sequences—identical to naturally occurring sequences—
encompassing the full length gene sequence; (2) shorter isolated 
 
 115  Id. at 202. 
 116  Id.  
 117  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) (stating that the University of Utah is the owner of the patents in suit).  
 118  See ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/brca-faqs (last visited Apr. 23, 
2013). 
 119  See Genetic Testing Facilities and Cost, BREASTCANCER.ORG, 
http://www.breastcancer.org/symptoms/testing/genetic/facility_cost (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2012). 
 120  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (referring to cease and desist letters concerning BRAC1/2 genetic 
testing sent to Dr. Kazazian, the University of Pennsylvania, and the director of the 
Yale DNA Diagnostics Lab). 
 121  Kevin E. Noonan, USPTO Holds First Hearing on “Second Opinion” Genetic Testing, 
PATENT DOCS (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/02/uspto-holds-
hearing-on-second-opinion-genetic-testing.html (stating that Myriad generally 
prevented other testing labs from performing its patented test). 
 122  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 206–07; Olga Bogard, 
Patenting the Human Body: The Constitutionality of Gene Patents and Suggested Remedies for 
Reform, 63 SMU L. REV. 1319, 1326 (2010) (stating that Myriad took an 
“unprecedented [path] in the field of genetic testing” by strictly enforcing their 
rights to exclude others from using their invention). 
 123  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 211–12.  
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sequences of DNA—measuring as short as fifteen nucleotides; and 
(3) cDNA molecules which are distinct from the naturally occurring 
sequences in that their non-coding segments have been removed, 
and they are complimentary to naturally occurring DNA.124  Claims 1 
and 5 in Patent 5,747,282 are representative of the composition 
claims at issue in this case and recite: “1. An isolated DNA coding for 
a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid 
sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 2 . . . 5. An isolated DNA having at 
least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1 . . . .”125  Isolated DNA is 
often an essential element in many procedures to diagnose diseases 
and detect genetic disorders.126 
In response to the restrictive licensing and high costs of 
obtaining BRCA1/2 tests, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”), the Association for Molecular Pathology, several non-
profit women’s organizations, research scientists, and individuals 
initiated a lawsuit in 2010 challenging the validity of Myriad’s patents 
in the Southern District of New York.127  In a departure from what was 
the common practice of upholding gene patents, Judge Sweet—
emphasizing the similarity between the function of isolated genes and 
native DNA as carriers of information128—determined that Myriad’s 
composition and method claims impermissibly sought to patent 
ineligible products of nature under 35 U.S.C. § 101.129  Judge Sweet, 
in an effort to differentiate isolated DNA from other chemical 
compounds that were the subjects of previous patents,130 pointed to 
 
 124  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), 
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 125  U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995). 
 126  See George Rice, DNA Extraction, http://serc.carleton.edu/microbelife
/research_methods/genomics/dnaext.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2013). 
 127  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 186–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. 
App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 128  See id. at 228. 
 129  See id. at 238. 
 130  See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 496 (2d Cir. 1912), 
supra note 18 (noting that chemical substances, like crystalline adrenaline, were 
patent eligible). 
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the dual nature of DNA—acknowledging that it is both a chemical 
compound and also a physical carrier of genetic information.131  
Judge Sweet further declared that Myriad’s diagnostic method claims 
were invalid because they claimed a comparison—an unpatentable 
mental process—of genetic sequences to determine if differences 
existed.132 
Myriad appealed to the Federal Circuit, which issued its first 
ruling in the case on July 29, 2011.133  Judge Lourie, in his majority 
opinion, looked to the framework for determining patent eligibility 
set out in Funk Bros. and Chakrabarthy, which asked whether the 
subject matter at issue was “markedly different”134 from that which 
exists in nature.135  Judge Lourie—concluding that Myriad’s isolated 
DNA met this minimum standard and was patent eligible—pointed to 
the unique chemical structure of isolated DNA.136  He indicated that 
Judge Sweet erred in determining patent eligibility based on a 
comparison of the function of isolated and genomic DNA and 
instead urged that isolated DNA be considered a distinct chemical 
entity.137  Judge Lourie also cautioned against departing from the 
USPTO’s current practice of awarding gene patents and advised that 
such a dramatic change in policy be initiated by the legislature and 
not the courts.138 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Moore indicated that the 
difference in chemical structure between isolated DNA and genomic 
 
 131  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
 132  See id. at 233–37. 
 133  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), 
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 134  Id. at 1351 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)). 
 135  See id. at 1351. 
 136  See id. (contrasting isolated DNA with native DNA and explaining that: 
Native DNA exists in the body as one of forty-six large, contiguous DNA 
molecules.  Each DNA molecule is itself an integral part of a larger 
structural complex, a chromosome.  In each chromosome, the DNA 
molecule is packaged around histone proteins into a structure called 
chromatin, which in turn is packaged into the chromosomal 
structure . . . .  Isolated DNA, in contrast, is a free-standing portion of a 
native DNA molecule, frequently a single gene.  Isolated DNA has been 
cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed) 
or synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally occurring DNA 
molecule.). 
 137  See id. at 1353. 
 138  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1354–55. 
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DNA was not enough, by itself, to render isolated DNA “markedly 
different” from genomic DNA and thus patentable per se.139  Rather, 
Judge Moore engaged in a more searching inquiry, asking “whether 
these differences impart a new utility which makes [isolated DNA] 
markedly different from nature.”140  He concluded that shorter 
isolated DNA segments were clearly patent eligible given they are 
particularly well-suited to accomplish a number of tasks that genomic 
DNA could not accomplish.141  Judge Moore conceded that larger 
isolated DNA fragments presented a more difficult question of patent 
eligibility,142 because although they have the same chemical 
characteristics as shorter isolated fragments, they do not retain the 
same utility.143  Nonetheless, Judge Moore concluded that because 
Congress has generally “authorized an expansive scope of patentable 
subject matter,” and the USPTO has allowed patents on isolated DNA 
for decades, these settled expectations of patent law “tip[ped] the 
scale in favor of patentability.”144 
Judge Bryson’s dissent maintained that Myriad’s composition 
claims were categorically directed to unpatentable subject matter.145  
In an approach similar to the one adopted by Judge Sweet in his 
district court opinion, Judge Bryson’s holding was based on an 
understanding that the chemical differences between isolated and 
genomic DNA were of secondary importance to the actual function of 
isolated and genomic DNA—which both operate to transfer 
information.146  Judge Bryson rebutted the majority’s reliance on 
USPTO precedent by pointing out that the USPTO’s guidelines are 
 
 139  See id. at 1364–65 (Moore, J., concurring in part). 
 140  Id. at 1365.  
 141  See id. (explaining that while “[smaller isolated DNA] sequences can be used 
as primers in a diagnostic screening process to detect gene mutations . . . [and] as 
the basis for probes . . .  [n]aturally occurring DNA cannot be used to accomplish 
these same goals”).   
 142  See id. at 1366 (defining “longer strand” as a piece of isolated DNA containing 
“most or all of the entire gene” and stating that “[l]onger strands of isolated DNA, in 
particular isolated strands which include most or all of the entire gene, are a much 
closer case”). 
 143  See id. (noting that longer isolated segments are unsuitable as primers which 
are typically only 100–1,000 bases in length). 
 144  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), 
cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 
890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 145  See id. at 1373. 
 146  See id. at 1378. 
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not entitled to significant weight, as indicated by the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to adhere to the guidelines—which stated that 
microorganisms were not patent eligible at the time they decided 
Chakrabarty.147  Furthermore, Judge Bryson noted that the Department 
of Justice—which speaks for the executive branch, to which the 
USPTO belongs—filed a brief taking the position that Myriad’s 
composition claims were not eligible for patenting.148  Judge Bryson 
further raised policy arguments in support of his determination that 
isolated DNA should not be patent eligible—including concerns 
about the preemptive force of Myriad’s broad claims on “the next 
generation of innovation in genetic medicine . . . .”149 
The Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold Myriad’s composition 
claims directed to isolated human DNA marked a victory not only for 
Myriad, but also for the entire biotechnology industry.  Following the 
court’s decision, the ACLU petitioned the Federal Circuit to review 
the decision, arguing that the court “erred in failing to consider 
whether the DNA fragments claimed in these patents are products of 
nature.”150  When the Federal Circuit declined to accept the petition 
for a rehearing, the ACLU filed a petition for writ of certiorari.151  
Less than a week after its decision in Mayo was announced, the 
Supreme Court granted the pending petition for a writ of 
certiorari.152  The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and 
remanded the case to that court for “further consideration in light of 
[Mayo].”153 
Although the Federal Circuit’s second Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology decision purports to evaluate the effect of Mayo on the 
patent eligibility of the isolated DNA at issue in Ass’n for Molecular 
 
 147  See id. at 1380–81. 
 148  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853320, at *10 (“[I]solated but 
otherwise unaltered genomic DNA is not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.”). 
 149  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 150  Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 
2010-1406), 2011 WL 5057016, at *1.  
 151  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics Inc., (No. 11-725), 2011 WL 6257250. 
 152  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794, 
1794 (2012). 
 153  Id. 
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Pathology,154 in fact, it only glancingly acknowledged the Supreme 
Court’s Mayo decision.  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its 
holding that the composition claims covering isolated DNA 
sequences associated with predisposition to breast and ovarian 
cancers were directed to patent-eligible subject matter.155 
 IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT FAILED TO INCORPORATE MAYO INTO ASS’N 
FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY 
The Federal Circuit summarized its primary rationale for its 
dismissive treatment of Mayo on remand by stating that: “[t]he 
principal claims of the patents before us on remand relate to isolated 
DNA molecules.  Mayo does not control the question of patent-
eligibility of such claims.”156  In other words, the Federal Circuit 
largely disregarded Mayo because Mayo dealt with the patent 
eligibility of method claims while the claims at issue in Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology were directed to compositions of matter.  Notably, as 
discussed infra, neither Supreme Court nor Federal Circuit precedent 
supports the Federal Circuit’s treatment of different types of claims as 
each having their own distinct set of concerns.157  In fact, the Court 
has indicated that, in the process of determining whether certain 
categories of claims are eligible for patenting, it is appropriate to 
draw upon concerns raised in dealing with one category of claim and 
consider their applicability in the context of another type of claim.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Gottschalk v. Benson and Bilski v. 
Kappos are illustrative of the Court’s practice of applying concerns 
across claim types.158 
The claimed invention in Benson was a “method for converting 
binary coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.”159  
The claims professed to cover any use of the method in any apparatus 
or machine of any type.160  While the claims were initially rejected by 
the USPTO—and then by the Board of Patent Appeals—they were 
 
 154  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 
F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013).  (“Our decision on remand . . . both decides the issues that were before 
us in the original appeal and evaluates the effect of Mayo on those issues.”). 
 155  See id. at 1326.  
 156  Id. at 1325. 
 157  See infra notes 158–174 and accompanying text.  
 158  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972).  
 159  Id. at 64. 
 160  See id.  
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upheld by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.161  The Acting 
Commissioner of Patents then obtained certiorari.162  In arriving at 
the conclusion that a computer program—without substantial 
practical application except in association with a computer—was not 
a patentable process, the Court repeated its frequently expressed 
concern that “phenomena of nature . . . mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic 
tools of scientific and technological work.”163  The Court cautioned 
that “[upholding] the patent would wholly pre-empt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on 
the algorithm itself.”164  The Court went on to quote its Funk Bros. 
decision, stating that “[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the 
law recognizes.”165  The Court continued, stating, “[w]e dealt [in Funk 
Bros.] with a ‘product claim,’ while the present case deals with a 
‘process’ claim.  But we think the same principle applies.”166 
The Court’s reasoning regarding the preemptive effect on the 
mathematical formula that would result from upholding the patent in 
Benson is analogous to the preemptive effect on the genetic code that 
would result from upholding Myriad’s composition claims.  In the 
same way that upholding the patent on the mathematical formula in 
Benson—which “ha[d] no substantial practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer”—would have wholly preempted 
the use of the mathematical formula, upholding Myriad’s 
composition claims directed to genes—the only physical 
embodiments of the genetic code—would effectively preempt the use 
of the genetic code.167  Thus, Benson can be read to caution against 
upholding patents that would have broad preemptive effects in a field 
by allowing courts to impute concerns previously attributable only to 
a certain type of claim and to consider them in the context of 
different claim types. 
Bilski, like Benson, illustrates the notion that concerns raised in 
the context of one type of claim are applicable to other claim types.  
In attempting to clarify the plurality opinion, Justice Stevens’s 
 
 161  Application of Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  
 162  See Benson, 409 U.S. at 63.  
 163  Id. at 67.  
 164  Id. at 72. 
 165  Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948)). 
 166  Id. at 67–68.  
 167  Id. at 71.  
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concurrence highlighted a number of perceived deficiencies in the 
Court’s analysis of subject-matter eligibility.168  Stevens placed the 
plurality’s suggestion that “the [subject-matter eligibility] analysis 
turns on the category of patent involved” among those deficiencies.169  
Stevens, instead, maintained that “we have never in the past 
suggested that the [patent-eligible subject matter] inquiry varies by 
subject matter.”170 
Finally—despite its departure from this concept in its Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology opinion on remand—even the Federal Circuit has 
explicitly recognized that the scope of a 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis 
should not be limited by the claim type.171  In AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Communications, Inc., the court stated that “we consider the scope of § 
101 to be the same regardless of the form—machine or process—in 
which a particular claim is drafted.”172  The court acknowledged that 
“the Supreme Court’s decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Flook, all of 
which involved method (i.e., process) claims, have provided and 
supported the principles which we apply to both machine-and 
process-type claims.”173  The Federal Circuit went on to apply its 
reasoning from two cases dealing with composition claims to the 
method claims at issue in the case before it.174 
Therefore, Benson, Bilski, and AT&T can be read to contravene 
the Federal Circuit’s primary rationale for its dismissive treatment of 
Mayo—that Mayo dealt with method claims while Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology deals with composition claims.  These cases provide clear 
examples of instances where courts recognized the universal 
applicability of the concerns raised in the context of one type of 
claim and considered the implications of those concerns in the 
context of another type of claim.  Instead of recognizing that the 
 
 168  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3234–36 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 169  Id. at 3236. 
 170  Id.  
 171  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 
F.3d 1303, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring) cert. granted in part, 133 S. 
Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (acknowledging that “the Prometheus 
discussion of laws of nature (process claims) clearly ought to apply equally to 
manifestations of nature (composition claims).  Myriad’s argument that Prometheus is 
constrained to methods is an untenable position.”).  Notably, Judge Moore did not 
modify her analysis to reflect this statement on remand and joined Judge Lourie in 
upholding Myriad’s patents.  Id. 
 172  AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 173  See id. 
 174  See id.  
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concerns the Court raised in Mayo in the context of method claims 
were applicable to composition claims, the Federal Circuit ignored 
this instruction from precedent and chose to consider different claim 
types in isolation. 
In arriving at its conclusion that Myriad’s isolated DNA 
molecules were patent eligible, the Federal Circuit also erred in 
confining its analysis to Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty175—from which the 
court gleaned the “markedly different” test for determining the 
patent eligibility of compositions of matter.176  This error becomes 
apparent upon considering the Supreme Court’s repeated 
disinclination to adhere to rigid tests developed by the Federal 
Circuit in favor of more nuanced and holistic analyses.  The dynamic 
between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in the two cases 
is indicative of the common approach employed by the Court when 
faced with a decision of whether or not to adhere to a mechanical test 
proffered by the Federal Circuit. 
For instance, as discussed earlier, the Court chose not to adopt 
the Federal Circuit’s exclusive application of the M or T test to 
determine whether the subject matter at issue in Prometheus’s 
patents was eligible for patenting.177  KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. is 
also representative of the Court’s practice of declining to adhere to 
the rigid tests for deciding issues of patentablity as applied by the 
Federal Circuit.178  Although the issue presented in KSR concerned 
whether the claimed invention was obvious—another obstacle to 
patentability—the Federal Circuit has explicitly weighed 
considerations from the obviousness context into the calculus for 
determining  patent eligiblity under 35 U.S.C. § 101.179  In KSR, the 
Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s application of the 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation (“TSM”) test for obviousness was 
 
 175  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326 (“Chakrabarty and Funk 
Brothers set out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of 
compositions of matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”). 
 176  See Chakrabarty, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 177  See sources cited, supra notes 57–103 and accompanying text. 
 178  See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
 179  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011) Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), 
reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal 
reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (casting Funk Bros.—a case decided on 
obviousness—in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to serve as a comparison to the subject 
matter at issue in Chakrabarty). 
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overly rigid, and the Court urged that any approach to deciding 
issues of obviousness be flexible.180  As applied by the Federal Circuit, 
the TSM test was the principal mechanism for determining whether a 
claimed invention was obvious by looking for a teaching, suggestion, 
or motivation to combine certain existing inventions in a manner 
that yielded the claimed invention.181  If such a teaching, suggestion, 
or motivation were found, the invention would be obvious.182 
In holding that the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the 
TSM test in KSR was in error, the Supreme Court stated that the 
Court’s precedent “set[s] forth an expansive and flexible approach 
[for determining obviousness that is] inconsistent with the way the 
[Federal Circuit] applied its TSM test here.”183  The Court further 
characterized the TSM test as a “helpful insight,” but cautioned that 
“[h]elpful insights . . . need not become rigid and mandatory 
formulas.”184  The Court then stated that “when a court transforms [a] 
general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, 
as the [Federal Circuit] did here, it errs.”185 
Thus, Mayo and KSR demonstrate the Federal Circuit’s 
commitment to advancing rigid frameworks and the Supreme Court’s 
repeated insistence in response that the tests proffered by the Federal 
Circuit not be dispositive on the issues of patent eligibility under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 and obviousness, but rather that they occupy a small 
portion of the calculus toward reaching a workable conclusion.  The 
Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to the “markedly different” test, 
which it gleaned from Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty, provided the 
Supreme Court with yet another chance to reject the court’s narrow 
analysis in favor of a much more nuanced and fact specific 
determination.  For instance, neither Funk Bros. nor Chakrabarty 
analyzed the impact of issuing a patent to the claimed invention on 
the public or the risk of tying up the use of natural laws. 
In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, the Federal Circuit went to great 
lengths to divorce its decision from policy considerations.  Before 
engaging in an analysis of whether Myriad’s composition claims 
directed to isolated DNA were patent eligible, the Federal Circuit 
cautioned that “it is important to state what this appeal is not 
 
 180  See KSR Intern. Co., 550 U.S. at 419. 
 181  See id. at 418. 
 182  See id.  
 183  See id. at 415. 
 184  Id. at 419. 
 185  Id. 
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about.”186  The Federal Circuit contended that the Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology case was “not about whether individuals suspected of having 
an increased risk of developing breast cancer are entitled to a second 
opinion.”187  Nor was the case about “whether the . . . owner of the . . . 
patents, or Myriad, the exclusive licensee . . . acted improperly in its 
licensing or enforcement policies with respect to the patents.”188  The 
court also contended that the appeal was not about “whether is it 
[sic] desirable for one company to hold a patent or license covering a 
test that may save people’s lives . . . .”189  But in Mayo—which the 
Supreme Court intended to guide the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology on remand—the Court did not consider 
the issue of patent eligibility in a vacuum.  Rather, it examined the 
landscape of patent eligibility from a position that fully accounted for 
the policy implications of its decision, paying particular attention to 
its concern that awarding a patent may tie up the use of natural laws 
in an area.190  This broad view of the question of subject-matter 
eligibility was the essence of the Court’s holding in Mayo, and this 
marriage of precedent with policy is disturbingly absent from the 
Federal Circuit’s first and second Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
opinions. 
Finally, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the statement from 
Chakrabarty in support of an extraordinarily broad scope of patent-
eligible subject matter—which indicates that, “[t]he Committee 
Reports accompanying the 1952 [Patent] Act inform us that Congress 
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun 
that is made by man’”—is misplaced.191  The full quote from the 
Committee Reports teaches a far more limited understanding of the 
scope of patentable subject matter.  The full quote instructs that, “[a] 
person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may 
include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not 
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of 
 
 186  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013).  
 187  Id. 
 188  Id.  
 189  Id.  
 190  See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.  
 191  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-
1979, at 5 (1952)); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
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[this] title are fulfilled.”192  As the Supreme Court cautioned when it 
heard Chakrabarty, “[t]his [quote] is not to suggest that § 101 has no 
limits or that it embraces every discovery.”193 
Had the Federal Circuit not dismissed the concerns the 
Supreme Court expressed in Mayo as applicable only to method 
claims, and instead accounted for the implications of tying up the use 
of the natural laws in the calculus for determining patent eligibility, it 
would likely have concluded that Myriad’s claims to isolated DNA 
were not patent eligible.  The Federal Circuit would have had to look 
no further than to the district court’s Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
opinion to get a sense of the dramatic impact that awarding patents 
on the isolated DNA had among patients, researchers, and other 
groups.194 
Research has shown that gene patents have “persistent negative 
effects on subsequent scientific research.”195  The possibility of 
obtaining patent protection for discoveries related to genetic 
research largely does not motivate scientists to conduct research and 
as a result, “patents are not needed for much of U.S. basic genetic 
research to occur.”196  One of the primary purposes of the U.S. patent 
system—full disclosure of a claimed invention—is already 
accomplished by “the norms of academic science” which encourage 
 
 192  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3249 (2010) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, 
at 5; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6) (emphasis added). 
 193  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
 194  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d. 181, 208–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. 
App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (describing the effects of Myriad’s gene patents on 
researchers who stopped BRCA1/2 testing upon receiving cease-and-desist letters 
regarding the patents in suit, doctors who are unable to disseminate the results of 
patients’ BRCA1/2 tests, genetic counselors who are unable to send patient samples 
to laboratories other than Myriad for testing, and patients who are unable to pay the 
full cost of BRCA1/2 tests out of pocket  if the tests are not covered by insurance).   
 195  See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012 
WL 2215682, at *11 (quoting Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16213, 2010)). 
 196  See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Gene Patents and Licensing Practices 
and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests: Report of the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, at 2 (2010), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf. 
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full disclosure of research results in peer reviewed journals.197  As 
much as forty six percent of labs conducting genetic research feel 
that gene patents either delayed or limited their research.198  The 
exclusive rights conferred by gene patents do not result in faster 
genetic test development nor are they necessary for the development 
of genetic tests to detect rare genetic diseases.199  In fact, the discovery 
of the BRCA1/2 genes was made possible by substantial funding from 
the National Institutes of Health and through the use of well-known 
sequencing techniques by teams of scientists—some of whom were 
resolutely opposed to patenting the BRCA1/2 genes.200  Some 
researchers have characterized DNA patents as “difficult, if not 
impossible, to circumvent”201 because the patents often foreclose 
research on both the effects of the DNA sequence and the naturally 
occurring gene.202 
Regarding the effects of gene patents on patients seeking 
patented therapies, research has indicated that “where patents and 
licensing practices have created a sole provider of a genetic test, 
patient access to those tests has suffered in a number of ways.”203  
First, when a sole-provider of a genetic test does not accept a patient’s 
insurance, the cost of obtaining the test often proves prohibitive for 
large numbers of patients.204  Second, in situations where gene 
patents have created a sole-provider, patients are unable to obtain an 
independent second opinion on test results.205  It has been recognized 
 
 197  Id.  
 198  See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012 
WL 2215682, at *10–11. 
 199  U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 196.   
 200  See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, Information Society Project at Yale Law 
School Scholars in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 
2012 WL 2885885, at *5–6. 
 201  Isabelle Huys, et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 907 (2009). 
 202  See Brief for Knowledge Ecology International and Universities Allied for 
Essential Medicines as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Supporting 
Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012 WL 2885874, at *7. 
 203  Brief of Professor Eileen M. Kane as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 476049, at *25. 
 204  See id. 
 205  See id. at *44 (explaining that “[t]he legal complaint filed against Myriad 
names one plaintiff who would have liked a second opinion on her BRCA1/BRCA2 
genetic test results but instead had to make major medical decisions based on the 
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that “[c]onfirmatory testing by another laboratory is the ‘laboratory 
equivalent to the time-honored practice of obtaining a second 
opinion from a clinician.’”206  Sole-providers of genetic tests that 
aggressively enforce their patents could cause additional access 
problems for patients.207  In one instance, patients with familial long 
QT syndrome—a life-threatening condition—were unable to receive 
testing for the condition  for an eighteen month period because the 
patent holder had not yet developed a commercial genetic test but 
sought to exclude others from infringing on its patent by providing a 
similar test.208  Although scientists identified targeted cancer therapies 
effective in treating those with BRCA mutations years ago, evidence 
suggests that BRCA1/2 gene patents have hindered the availability of 
treatments.209 
Finally, gene patents often have deteriorative effects on genetic 
test quality.210  A researcher opined that “the most robust method for 
assuring quality in laboratory testing is through ‘comparison of 
results obtained on samples shared between different labs.’”211  
Competition among multiple laboratories offering genetic testing for 
the same indication often acts as a catalyst for improvements in test 
quality and for the development of more thorough testing 
techniques.212  Sample sharing and competition often do not occur in 
environments where a sole-provider of a genetic test prevents others 
 
Myriad test results alone”). 
 206  Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and 
Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711, at *7 
(describing one of the plaintiffs in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology who was unable to 
obtain a second opinion on the results of her BRCA1/2 tests results and was forced 
to make major medical decisions—such as whether to pursue the treatment options 
of a mastectomy or oophorectomy (ovary removal)—based on the results of a single 
test). 
 207  See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 196.   
 208  Id. at 3–4, 40 (describing other instances where exclusive rights have been 
enforced as a means for preventing clinical laboratories from offering genetic 
testing). 
 209  See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012 
WL 2215682, at *10 (quoting Susan M. Domcheck et al., Challenges to the Development 
of New Agents for Molecularly Defined Patient Subsets: Lessons from BRCA1/2 – Associated 
Breast Cancer, 29 J. ON CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4224 (2011)).  
 210  See Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and 
Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711, at *4.  
 211  Id. at 8.  
 212  See id.  
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from providing testing.213  A 2006 study of 300 individuals who 
received negative test results from Myriad’s BRAC test, despite 
coming from families comprised of individuals with four or more 
members that had breast or ovarian cancer, concluded that “genetic 
testing . . . does not provide all available information to women at 
risk . . . [since] 12% of those from high risk families with 
breast/ovarian cancer and with negative . . . commercial genetic test 
results for [BRCA1/2] nonetheless carry cancer-predisposing 
[mutations] in one of these genes.”214  The study went on to note that 
because of the expense and invasiveness of corrective procedures—
such as a mastectomy—inaccurate BRCA1/2 test results coupled with 
a patient’s inability to secure a second opinion can have particularly 
negative consequences.215 
V. ESTABLISHING A WAY FORWARD 
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court elected to grant 
certiorari in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, following the Federal 
Circuit’s cursory review of the impact of Mayo on the issues presented 
in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology.216  In agreeing to hear the case, 
however, the Court chose not to review whether the Federal Circuit 
erred in finding Mayo and Ass’n for Molecular Pathology irreconcilable, 
nor did the Court confine itself to addressing the issue of whether the 
petitioners lacked standing to challenge the validity of Myriad’s 
patents.217  Rather, the Court elected to review the broadest of the 
three questions raised by the petitioner, namely, “[a]re human genes 
patentable?”218  The fact that the Court chose to address this question 
suggested that the answer cannot be gleaned merely from the text of 
section 101.  Presumably, the process of developing an answer to the 
extraordinarily broad question of whether human genes are 
 
 213  Id.  
 214  Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and 
Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711, at *5–6 
(quoting Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and 
TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1379 (2006). 
 215  See id. at 6. 
 216  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 
(2012).  
 217  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 4502947. 
 218  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 
(2012); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 4502947, at *2. 
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patentable would have entailed an extra-statutory analysis of the 
issues.  Such an analysis should have been fresh in the Court’s mind 
after its decision in Mayo—where the Court carefully entertained a 
traditional section 101 analysis while simultaneously stepping away 
from the statute to account for the policy implications of its decision, 
concluding that the Prometheus patents were not directed to patent-
eligible subject matter.219 
Of particular concern to the unanimous Court in Mayo was the 
inhibitory effect that upholding the Prometheus patents would have 
on subsequent developments in the field of thiopurine 
administration.220  The Court noted that the patents “threaten[ed] to 
inhibit the development of more refined treatment 
recommendations . . . that combine Prometheus’s correlations with 
later discovered features of metabolites, human physiology or 
individual patient characteristics.”  This concern should have applied 
with equal or greater force to Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents because 
while the Court emphasized that Prometheus’s patents threatened to 
inhibit the development of subsequent treatments, Myriad’s patents 
have already had a substantial preemptive effect on further genetic 
research, genetic test development, and patient access to testing.221  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
decision failed to provide authority for considering policy 
implications in the section 101 analysis.222 
Of course, in order to use Mayo as authority for an extra-
statutory analysis of whether certain subject matter is patent eligible, 
the Court must have been satisfied that the considerations it 
advanced in Mayo are not limited to method claims.  Although the 
claims at issue in Mayo were directed toward a method of 
administering thiopurines, the Court made no representations that 
the concerns it raised in Mayo were limited to the method claim 
context—contrary to the Federal Circuit’s argument in Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology on remand.223  Instead, it is likely that the Court 
 
 219  See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
 220  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 
(2012). 
 221  See sources cited, supra notes 195–215 and accompanying text. 
 222  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013).  
 223  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013).  
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recognized that questions of subject-matter eligibility are often 
extremely complex, and that some cases merit a more in-depth 
consideration of the varied effects of upholding patents on certain 
subject matter.  Relying primarily on Benson, Bilski, and AT&T, which 
all support the notion that concerns raised in the context of one type 
of claim are applicable in the context of another, the Court should 
have emphasized that Mayo is particularly applicable to the issues in 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology.  Such a finding would have enabled the 
Court to weigh the significant policy implications of affording human 
genes patent protection—including the substantial preemptive effect 
such protection would have on future studies of patented human 
genes—and would have ultimately led the Court to the same 
conclusion it announced in its recent opinion.224 
The Supreme Court handed down its Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
decision on June 13, 2013.225  Justice Thomas, who authored the 
opinion, was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, 
Ginsberg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan.226  Justice Scalia filed 
a three sentence opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment.227  The Court held that genomic DNA does not become 
patent eligible under section 101 merely by being isolated.228 
The Court acknowledged that Myriad did not in any way create 
or alter the genetic information actually encoded in the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes.229  Rather, the Court characterized Myriad’s principal 
contribution as simply “uncovering the precise location and genetic 
sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes within chromosomes 17 
and 13.”230  The Court stated that despite the extensive effort required 
to isolate the genes at issue, that effort alone was “insufficient to 
satisfy the demands of § 101.”231  The Court declined to adopt 
Myriad’s argument that the process of isolating genes—which 
requires researchers to sever covalent bonds—sufficiently transforms 
the isolated genetic material.232  The Court noted that the language of 
 
 224  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) (concluding 
that isolated human genes are not patent eligible).  
 225  See id.  
 226  Id. at 2110.  
 227  Id. at 2120.  
 228  See id.  
 229  See id. at 2116. 
 230  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013). 
 231  Id. at 2118. 
 232  See id. 
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Myriad’s claims was directed to the genetic information contained in 
the BRCA1/2 genes and not the chemical structure of the genes.233  
The Court identified additional language in Myriad’s patents which 
tended to show that Myriad’s invention was primarily merely an 
unpatentable discovery, including assertions that the location of the 
genes was unknown until Myriad found it and Myriad’s extensive 
description of the process it used to “discover” the genes.234 
Noticeably absent from the Court’s opinion, however, is any 
consideration of the policy implications that would have resulted 
from extending patent protection to the BRCA1/2 genes.  This 
failure to account for important policy concerns in the section 101 
analysis is unfortunate.  Mayo perfectly set the table for the idea that 
policy considerations should be weighed into the section 101 
analysis,235 but the Court’s opinion fails to consider how individuals 
may be physically harmed by the exclusionary effect of patents after a 
patent-eligibility determination.  The Court’s failure to define the 
appropriate role of policy considerations in the section 101 inquiry 
after Mayo will leave lower courts uncertain about the appropriate 
weight to afford these important policy factors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion suggested that when the 
Court considered whether human genes are patentable, it would take 
a broad view of the implications of its decision and ultimately weigh 
the well-documented effects of tying up the use of natural laws in this 
area into the calculus for determining whether this unique subject 
matter is patent eligible.  This concept was bolstered by the Court’s 
explicit recognition in Benson and Bilski that the analysis of subject-
matter eligibility should not be narrowly confined to comparisons 
between identical claim types and by the Court’s repudiation of the 
Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to inflexible standards for patent 
eligibility and obviousness in Mayo and KSR, respectively.  While the 
Court ultimately concluded that isolated human genes are not 
eligible for patenting, and thus that Myriad’s claims directed to 
isolated BRCA1/2 DNA are not patent eligible, the Court failed to 
address important policy factors that favored a finding of patent 
ineligibility.  The Court should have noted that declining to extend 
patent protection to human genes will positively impact genetic test 
 
 233  See id. 
 234  See id.  
 235  See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
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quality, test development, and patient access to genetic tests.  
Importantly, such a ruling would have also provided lower courts with 
a clearer picture of the appropriate subject-matter eligibility analysis 
for various forms of isolated DNA.  The ideal patent-eligibility analysis 
requires courts to satisfy the threshold requirements set forth in 
section 101, but also demands forward-looking considerations of the 
preemptive effects of granting patent protection. 
 
